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Do presidents unite or divide Congress? In new research which analyses more than 6,000 roll call
votes over nearly 40 years, Travis J. Baker finds that members of the opposition party are about 6
percent less likely to support a president’s priorities than members of the president’s party. This
occurs even when legislators have the same voting record, and the differences get wider as
presidents speak for longer on the issue. He argues that this effect is mainly driven by divided
government, since at those times Congress is more likely to vote for bills which are opposed to the
president’s agenda.
Presidents talk a lot about bipartisanship. It seemed like an obsession for Obama, at least in his first term. Speech
after speech, from the stimulus, to the Affordable Care Act, to Dodd-Frank, Obama stressed the common ground
that the two parties shared. But at the end of the day, he had little to show for his efforts. In his second term, Obama
has turned to executive actions to secure his legacy – a tactic which has met with mixed success.
Obama’s failed attempts at winning bipartisan support are nothing new. In recent research I show that presidents
since at least Nixon have polarized Congress when they prioritize issues. And polarization worsens as presidents
place more emphasis on an issue. The harder presidents try to win bipartisanship, the more elusive it becomes.
Using data from more than 6,000 roll call votes between 1971 and 2010, I calculate Congress members’
probabilities of supporting votes on the floor. I examine the difference between members’ support levels on votes
that are and are not a part of the president’s priority list, which I glean from his most recent State of the Union
speech. To do this, I adapt a procedure first used by Jim Snyder and Tim Groseclose to measure party influence on
members’ votes. The procedure calculates the difference between opposition-party members and presidential-party
members with otherwise identical voting records in their probabilities of supporting the presidents’ position.
The data show that opposition-party members are about six percent less likely to support presidents’ priorities than
presidential-party members with otherwise identical voting records, and this effect holds regardless of whether party
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control of government is unified or divided. At first glance, six percent might sound small. But if a number of
members are on the fence about a given vote, an additional six percent difference between Democrats and
Republicans can mean the difference between the vote passing and failing.
Furthermore, the difference only gets wider as presidents give more time to an issue in their speech. On the issues
of greatest presidential attention, the difference between opposition-party members and presidential-party members
with otherwise identical voting records is about twelve percent larger than issues of least presidential attention.
However, this effect is mainly driven by divided government – when the president and the House or Senate majority
are of different parties. In unified government, additional presidential attention to an issue has no detectable effect on
polarization. This may be due to the types of bills Congress considers in unified and divided government. In unified
government, Congress typically votes on bills furthering the president’s agenda. But in divided government,
Congress is more likely to vote on bills opposed to the president’s agenda. The fact that additional presidential
attention only polarizes Congress in divided government may indicate that the effect is driven more by the
opposition party’s resistance than the presidential party’s support.
Finally, the polarizing effect of presidents has remained roughly constant over the forty year period, as shown in
Figure 1 below. The graph presents the average difference between opposition-party members and presidential-
party members (which I call the “Presidential Effect”) for each year in the data. Note that more negative values
represent a larger presidential effect.
Figure 1 – The presidential effect, 1971–2010
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Note: Regression coefficient = .0008, SE = .0011. The regression indicates that the
presidential effect has not changed much over time. The presidential effect is 3.92 percent
larger in presidential election years, but this difference is not statistically significant. With the
1988 election removed, the effect lessens to 2.15 percent. p > .10 (all tests of statistical
significance are two-tailed).
These findings add to a growing chorus in political science research that questions presidents’ abilities to lead
Congress. In Beyond Ideology, Frances Lee used a similar measure of presidents’ agendas to show that presidents
divide Congress more than they unite it. In The Strategic President, George Edwards III meticulously combed
through presidents’ records to show their inability to persuade Congress.
So how can presidents increase their chances of congressional success? Speeches tend to exacerbate polarization
and make compromises harder to find. In today’s already polarized climate, presidents may decide to forgo
bipartisanship altogether. In that case, the data show that presidents may be able to increase support from their base
by giving more speeches. But if presidents do seek at least a modicum of bipartisanship, they would be wise to
avoid the call of the podium. 
This article is based on the paper ‘Delayed Gratification Party Competition for White House Control in the U.S.
House of Representatives’ in Political Research Quarterly.
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